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1. This Time it’s Personal 
 
To my mind, being wrong is nowhere near as disheartening as being boring, so I am 
encouraged by the fact that, in the four chapters immediately preceding this one, four thinkers 
for whom I have nothing but the utmost intellectual respect have found my ongoing project to 
articulate the philosophical groundwork for a genuinely Heideggerian cognitive science 
interesting enough that they have taken the trouble to explain precisely why it is flawed. Just 
how deep the supposed flaws go depends on which set of criticisms one chooses to read. For 
Ratcliffe and Rehberg they go very deep indeed, since, for these thinkers, there is a sense in 
which the very idea of a Heideggerian cognitive science borders on the incoherent. Dreyfus 
and Rietveld, on the other hand, seem to agree with me that something worth calling a 
Heideggerian cognitive science is certainly possible; it’s just that my version of it is seriously 
defective.  
 
Although being interesting and wrong is preferable to being boring and right, one aspires to 
be interesting and right. In what follows, then, I shall endeavour to resist what I take to be the 
most powerful (although admittedly not all) of the criticisms tabled in each of the chapters 
just mentioned. In setting up my contribution to the present volume in this way, I don’t for 
one moment mean to suggest that criticizing my position is all, or indeed the most important 
thing, that these papers do. Far from it: the positive contributions they make in bringing the 
relations between Heideggerian philosophy and cognitive science into better view – the 
multiply elusive ‘and’ in the identifier ‘Heidegger and cognitive science’, as Rehberg (this 
volume) would have it – are a great deal more significant than their problematizations of my 
own view. Still, I am self-interested enough to spend my time here defending myself in the 
line of fire, which is why, in what follows, I shall be arguing that Ratcliffe, Rehberg, Dreyfus 
and Rietveld (in roughly that order) have further work to do before my letter of surrender 
arrives in their inboxes. That said, the goal of this chapter may also be expressed in a way 
that avoids the egocentric emphasis placed on it so far: that goal is to defend both the very 
idea of a Heideggerian cognitive science and a certain vision of what such a cognitive science 
will look like, at least in part. So, adopting something of a pantomime register, I shall suggest 
that the right response to Ratcliffe’s (this volume) strident claim that there can be no 
cognitive science of Dasein (where ‘Dasein’ is Heidegger’s term for the distinctive kind of 
entity that human beings as such are) is to shout back (with gusto) ‘oh yes there can!’.  
 
2. Keeping Dasein out of the Lab    
 
Let’s begin with the arguments of Ratcliffe and Rehberg. It is important to record at the 
outset that neither of these thinkers hold cognitive science to be an intellectually 
worthless endeavour that is incapable of yielding important insights about its subject 
matter. Thus Rehberg (this volume, p.??) stresses that “[w]hat is at stake… is not 
scientific practice, scientific achievements or the positive role the sciences play in 
modern life”, while Ratcliffe (this volume, p.??) emphasizes that his intention “is not to 
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dismiss cognitive science altogether but to suggest that there is a principled limit to its 
potential aspirations”. In their different ways, however, Ratcliffe and Rehberg each 
argue that there exists some sort of in-principle barrier to the proposal that cognitive 
science might be developed in a genuinely Heideggerian direction. Hence Ratcliffe’s 
aim, as he himself describes it, is “to raise some philosophical concerns about the very 
idea of a ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’” (this volume, p.??). From this perspective, 
then, there is no need to examine the specific explanations that any so-called 
Heideggerian cognitive science might have offered – or at least if one does examine 
them one shouldn’t take their purported Heideggerian character seriously – because, in 
truth, the whole nascent paradigm is a kind of fiction.  
 
The first volley in Ratcliffe’s broadside is a general argument to the effect that Heidegger’s 
philosophy is incompatible with the naturalism that, according to me (see e.g. Wheeler, 2005, 
pp.4-7), ought to, and standardly does, accompany cognitive science. Indeed, it has always 
seemed to me that a healthy respect for the rich and diverse research programme that we call 
cognitive science requires a fundamental commitment to a thoroughgoing naturalism 
regarding human psychological phenomena. One can put this point another way: any 
philosophy of mind and cognition that rides shotgun with cognitive science must be 
naturalistic in form. So what is it for philosophy to be naturalistic in form? The guiding 
thought of naturalism is that philosophy should be continuous with empirical science. The 
question of just what this continuity might amount to will become an important issue for us 
soon. At present let’s simply note that the naturalist about some phenomenon X (e.g. about 
mind, cognition, sense-making or being-in-the-world) holds that the science related to X 
places constraints on our philosophical theorizing about X. Now, a genuinely Heideggerian 
cognitive science (as opposed to a cognitive science that occasionally borrows Heideggerian 
insights) will be a cognitive science that, to some significant degree, systematically integrates 
Heidegger’s philosophical framework with the foundational features of the cognitive-
scientific approach to mind, intelligence, thought and action. So if, as I have suggested, 
taking cognitive science seriously requires a commitment to a naturalism about psychological 
phenomena, then the prospects for a Heideggerian cognitive science rest, in part, on whether 
or not Heideggerian philosophy is, or can be made, compatible with that naturalism.  
 
It is at this point that Ratcliffe bares his teeth. According to Heideggerian philosophy, as 
interpreted by Ratcliffe, the distinctive manner in which empirical science, and so cognitive 
science in particular, reveals entities as the targets and the outcomes of its investigations, 
tacitly presupposes a sense of belonging to the world on the part of Dasein. This sense of 
belonging to the world is, in effect, a dimension of the distinctive manner in which Dasein is 
essentially in the world, an ‘in-ness’ that Heidegger christens dwelling (see e.g. Heidegger, 
1927, pp.79-80 ). To dwell in a house is not merely to be inside it spatially in a physical 
sense. Rather, it is to belong there, to have a familiar place there. This belonging or 
familiarity is sometimes illuminated by Heidegger by way of the thought that entities 
ordinarily make sense (are intelligible) to us within culturally and historically determined 
contexts of practical activity that, so to speak, arrive with us. For example, my laptop 
currently makes sense to me in relation to a skilled activity of text-editing; that text-editing is 
involved in writing a document; that document-writing is involved in meeting a professional 
deadline; and that meeting of a professional deadline is involved in my project of being a 
good academic. In a fundamental sense (although see below for a qualification), it is these 
Dasein-relative structures of significance within which entities are found that, in Heidegger’s 
analysis, interconnect, combine and interweave to make up the meaningful structure of a 
world. And what this indicates is that, in practical encounters with entities – encounters in 
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which, for Heidegger, entities are encountered principally as ready-to-hand  (i.e., smoothly 
available for skilled activity; see below) – the world is something with which each of us (as 
Dasein) is always already familiar, and to which each of us (as Dasein) has a sense of 
belonging (see e.g. Heidegger, 1927, p.119).  
 
As Ratcliffe understands things, Heidegger’s account of our belonging to the world generates 
a roughly transcendental case against naturalism, and so neatly places an in-principle barrier 
in the path of any proposal for a Heideggerian cognitive science. To see how this is supposed 
to work, we need to begin by reminding ourselves of Heidegger’s famous claim that science 
reveals entities in a mode of being (intelligibility) that he calls presence-at-hand. When 
revealed as present-at-hand, entities are encountered as removed from the familiar settings of 
everyday practical activity and thereby emerge as the kind of context-independent objects 
that populate science, that is, as the bearers of certain cross-contextual determinate or 
measurable properties (size in metres, weight in kilos, position in objective space etc.). With 
presence-at-hand brought into view, there are in truth two different ways in which a 
transcendental bulwark against naturalism might be erected, based on two different notions of 
worldliness that appear in Being and Time. (Although Ratcliffe doesn’t quite present things in 
this way, I do not think he would have any serious objections to my restaging, since, as I shall 
indicate, both of the resulting arguments appear in his text.) If one thinks of Dasein’s world 
as constituted by some global network of the kind of local contexts of practical activity 
highlighted above, then one might very well argue that the entities of science are “presented 
to us as stripped to varying degrees of the significance that they previously had, as having 
lost something” (Ratcliffe, this volume, p.??). On this view, to experience an entity as 
present-at-hand is to encounter it precisely as having-been-removed-from-the-world, which is 
of course a possible style of encounter only if the world itself (the network of Dasein-relative 
contexts of practical activity with which we are familiar) is presupposed (cf. Wheeler, 2005, 
p.165). Alternatively (and this is the aforementioned qualification to the Heideggerian notion 
of ‘world’), if one thinks of Dasein’s world not as a network of interconnected contexts of 
practical activity, but as the very structure of intelligibility itself (what Heidegger sometimes 
calls the worldhood of the world; see e.g. Heidegger, 1927, p.119), and if one thinks of 
scientific practice as itself a kind of sense-making, then one might very well argue that “both 
present-at-hand and ready-to-hand entities presuppose a world, within which it is possible to 
encounter entities in these ways” (Ratcliffe, this volume, p.??, my emphasis). And then it 
appears that the sense of familiarity and belonging that characterizes our distinctive world-
embeddedness will inevitably accompany scientific sense-making. Either way, then, it seems 
eminently arguable that Dasein’s sense of belonging to the world is a transcendental 
condition of the distinctive mode of sense-making that is characteristic of cognitive science, 
and so, one might think, cannot be brought within the explanatory reach of that science.  
 
Like Ratcliffe, Rehberg argues that, from a Heideggerian perspective, there is something 
about the fundamental philosophical profile of cognitive science, construed as a local 
dimension of modern scientific thinking in general, that renders it incapable in principle of 
reaching its explanatory goal. Once again the Heideggerian claim, that it is of the essence of 
modern science to reveal entities as present-at-hand, is to the fore, but now that claim takes 
on a form more readily associated with the later Heidegger (e.g. Heidegger, 1954) than the 
Heidegger of Being and Time. Articulated in this later modulation, the objectification of 
entities on which modern science depends – realized as a process of mathematization that 
renders entities apt for measuring and technical manipulation – is not only itself a partial 
understanding of entities (one mode of sense-making or being among others), it also obscures 
first, the entity as a site of multiple alternative dimensions of sense-making (what Rehberg 
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calls the self-differing nature of entities), and second, the essential revealing-concealing 
dynamic of that sense-making. In other words, modern science has the property of obscuring 
the fact that any way of making sense of entities (including its own) involves, as its 
concomitant flip-side, a necessary concealing of the plenitude of other (e.g. cultural, 
religious) ways in which those entities may have become intelligible. It is through this doubly 
obscuring character, based on the reduction of entities to objects and of intelligibility to the 
measurable and the manipulable, that scientific thinking comes to present itself as the one 
dominant account of reality, excluding all others.  
 
If Heidegger is right, then the philosophical irony, of course, is that science, as a mode of 
revealing, depends ultimately on the revealing-concealing dynamic of being, so science 
obscures the fundamental structure of its own functioning. But in the present context it is 
perhaps more telling to stress the related point that the scientific reduction of entities to mere 
objects ultimately obscures the fundamental self-differing character of entities. Thus “the 
more vigorously a science pursues its object, the more does the being, which it thus attempts 
to capture as object, withdraw itself” (Rehberg, this volume, p.??). The explanatory ‘object’ 
of a Heideggerian cognitive science would, of course, be Dasein as being-in-the-world, which 
generates the following, local application of the more general claim:  
 
the more comprehensively cognitive science tries to secure Dasein as its object, 
the more surely will Dasein escape objectification. But if ‘cognitive science’ were 
capable of…  giving up its essence – it would be able to approach Dasein without 
reducing it to the status of an object, but then it would not be a science, and it 
would not focus on human cognition – but perhaps on its ways of being. 
(Rehberg, this volume, p.??) 
 
According to Rehberg, then, a genuinely Heideggerian perspective is committed to the 
principle that Dasein (human being-in-the-world) may be understood only if we refrain 
from reducing it to a mere object. Since Dasein is the explanatory target of a 
Heideggerian cognitive science, for such a cognitive science to succeed, it would need 
to adopt a non-objectifying mode of sense-making. But the objectifying mode of sense-
making is an essential characteristic of modern science and thus of cognitive science. 
So a cognitive ‘science’ that adopted a non-objectifying mode of sense-making, and 
thereby managed to approach its explanatory target in a potentially fruitful way, would 
simultaneously cease to be a science. Doubt is thus cast on the very possibility of a 
genuinely Heideggerian cognitive science.  
 
(The observant reader will have noticed that there is a second aspect to Rehberg’s 
argument, as summarized in the quotation just above, namely that a cognitive ‘science’ 
that adopted a non-objectifying mode of sense-making would, in that process, shift its 
focus so as to concentrate not on human cognition but on Dasein’s situated ways of 
being. Although I do not have the space in the present treatment to pursue this thought 
in detail, it seems to me that, to the extent that there is an issue to be addressed here, it 
turns on the already-highlighted point about what is essential to cognitive science as a 
science. After all, the Heideggerian cognitive scientist is going to want to eschew 
narrow or Cartesian delineations of the domain of the cognitive, and to include  
Dasein’s situated ways of being within that domain, thereby agreeing to the shift in 
focus. So there is only a problem here if the Heideggerian cognitive scientist is 
somehow prevented from making that transition. One might argue that this would be 
the case, if the transition in question is impossible without Heideggerian cognitive 
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science surrendering its commitment to objectification (mathematization, 
measurability) and thus its status as a science. In a more indirect, but correspondingly 
richer way, Rehberg herself makes something like this point (see e.g. Rehberg, this 
volume, pp.??).) 
 
That, then, is the in-principle case against a Heideggerian cognitive science that I shall 
consider here. If Ratcliffe and Rehberg are right, the very idea of a Heideggerian 
cognitive science is fundamentally flawed. But are they right?   
    
3. Heideggerian Naturalism 
 
Ratcliffe and Rehberg present arguments that differ in their details. Nevertheless, those 
arguments have something in common, namely the thought that, for the scrupulous 
Heideggerian, there is something about cognitive science (whether it be a presupposed sense 
of belonging to the world or an objectifying mode of sense-making) that renders that 
discipline incapable, in principle, of illuminating human psychological existence in the 
manner to which it aspires. This shared thought may help to explain why, as we are about to 
see, both lines of critique are in fact blocked by the very same structural feature of the 
relationship that obtains between, on the one hand, the philosophical illumination of human 
thought and activity and, on the other, the cognitive science of that same thought and activity. 
This feature is one that Heidegger himself arguably explicated as clearly as anyone has 
(although, in truth, that amounts to nowhere near as clearly as one would like). Put bluntly, 
and in a way that makes the point seem largely banal, the key observation is that although, 
when it comes to the study of human being, the deliverances of philosophy and the 
deliverances of empirical cognitive science sometimes constrain each other in intelligible 
ways, the two disciplines are concerned centrally with generating different kinds of 
understanding. As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p.7) put it, with a focus on phenomenological 
philosophy that anticipates where we are going here, the phenomenologist and the 
psychologist are “taking different approaches, asking different questions, and looking for 
different kinds of answers”.  
 
I shall attempt to do justice to these differences by adopting a version of McDowell’s (1994) 
distinction between constitutive understanding and enabling understanding. Constitutive 
understanding is the characteristic target of philosophy, although not only of philosophy. It 
concerns the identification, articulation and clarification of the conditions that determine what 
it is for a phenomenon to be the phenomenon that it is (e.g. what it is for a certain kind of 
creature to competently inhabit its world). Enabling understanding is the characteristic target 
of empirical science, although not only of empirical science. It reveals the causal elements, 
along with the organization of and the systematic causal interactions between those elements, 
that together make it intelligible to us how a phenomenon of a certain kind could be realized 
or generated in a world like ours (e.g. how some creature-specific mode of competent world-
inhabiting is causally enabled in a purely physical universe). I shall argue that once we bring 
these two kinds of understanding, and the relationship between them, into proper view, the 
tension between Heideggerianism and cognitive science evaporates. Moreover, it evaporates 
in a manner that not only renders Ratcliffe’s point about our sense of belonging to the world 
consistent with a perfectly respectable psychological naturalism, but also allows a 
Heideggerian cognitive science to absorb Rehberg’s point about the objectifying effects of 
science. Unusually, then, this is a case in which it is possible to have one’s cake and to eat it.  
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(It is worth noting that McDowell tends to think of the constitutive understanding of human 
mentality and experience as being pitched at what he calls the personal level, and of the 
enabling understanding offered by empirical cognitive science as being pitched at what he 
calls the subpersonal level (McDowell, 1994). I avoid this additional terminology here, 
because, without the inclusion of a long and detailed analysis, the notion of the personal level 
would seem to imply the existence of some self-sufficient ontological entity – i.e., the person 
– that threatens to clash with Heidegger’s process-based notion of Dasein. For similar 
reasons, I am happy to concede Rehberg’s point that my previous talk of ‘Dasein’ as another 
term for the human agent is apt to be misleading (Wheeler, 2005; Rehberg, this volume). For 
what it’s worth, I think that an analysis that relieved the tensions here could be given, but in 
the present context it is more appropriate and less onerous simply to avoid the troublesome 
terminology.)  
 
Heideggerian philosophy may be depicted as seeking a particular sort of constitutive 
understanding. Articulated in a way that deliberately ignores certain well-rehearsed, 
politically charged issues of chauvinistic prejudice that are sometimes thought to attach to 
Heidegger’s analysis (see e.g. Wolin, 1993), the understanding  in question concerns an 
account of the conditions that determine what it means to live a human life. Heidegger’s 
philosophical strategy for delivering such an account of human existence is, famously, 
phenomenological in character. As developed in Being and Time (and arguably throughout 
Heidegger’s writings; see e.g. Wheeler forthcoming), phenomenology may be depicted as a 
theoretical (or perhaps a meta-theoretical) philosophical enterprise that, through an attentive 
and sensitive examination of ordinary human experience, aims to reveal the transcendental 
yet historical conditions which give that experience its form. Because these target structures 
are transcendentally presupposed by ordinary experience, they must in some sense be present 
with that experience, but they are not simply available to be read off from its surface, hence 
the need for disciplined and careful phenomenological analysis to reveal them. The 
historicality exhibited by the transcendental here is a consequence of what Heidegger takes to 
be the hermeneutic character of understanding in general, and thus of phenomenological 
understanding in particular. As an interpretative activity, phenomenological analysis is 
inevitably guided by certain historically embedded ways of thinking that the 
phenomenologist brings to the task, meaning that its results remain ceaselessly open to 
revision, enhancement and replacement. 
   
What results from Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation of human existence is, of 
course, his ground-breaking account of being-in-the-world. Here is not the place to attempt to 
lay out the systematic structure or content of that account (see Wheeler, forthcoming, for my 
own introduction), although later in this chapter some of its salient features will be discussed. 
What matters at present is the relationship that obtains between that constitutive 
understanding of human existence (whatever its details) and cognitive science. As already 
noted, cognitive science is paradigmatically in the business of providing an enabling 
understanding of psychological phenomena. More specifically, the goal of cognitive science 
is to map out the causal elements whose organization, operation and interaction enable 
psychological phenomena. Viewed through this philosophical lens, the aim of a Heideggerian 
cognitive science would be to develop an enabling understanding of (i.e., an account of the 
causal states and processes that underpin) the phenomena that constitute Dasein’s being-in-
the-world. Again, for the moment, the details of such an account don’t matter, although later 
in this chapter we will meet some examples of cognitive-scientific models that plausibly 
contribute to it. What concerns us right now is the relationship that obtains between 
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Heidegger’s phenomenological constitutive account (whatever its details) and the 
corresponding cognitive science (whatever its details). What, then, is that relationship?       
 
There is no good reason to think that constitutive understanding and enabling understanding 
must be reductively related. In particular, there is no good reason to think that constitutive 
accounts must be reducible to enabling accounts. That would be tantamount to a kind of 
runaway scientism (more on which in a moment), unpacked as the thought that science is the 
measure of all things. But, equally, there is no good reason to think that constitutive 
understanding and enabling understanding must be wholly independent of each other. Rather, 
our two kinds of understanding (and thus philosophy and cognitive science) will standardly 
engage in a process of mutual constraint and influence that McDowell (1994, p.197) tags with 
the enticing phrase “a perfectly intelligible interplay”. Although McDowell himself says 
disappointingly little about the nature of this interplay, its general shape seems clear enough.  
 
On the one hand, there is a sense in which philosophy, as a source of constitutive 
understanding, will isolate and clarify phenomena for which the corresponding cognitive 
science will then try to identify the underlying causal mechanisms. According to this model 
of constitutive-to-enabling influence, a phenomenological analysis that maps out the essential 
features and the conditions of possibility of human experience will provide a rich and 
systematic account of what the science of consciousness needs to explain. To borrow an 
example from Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p.10), if disciplined phenomenological analysis 
suggests an experiential profile according to which perception is always perspectivally 
incomplete (i.e., we never see all of an object at once), even though objects are presented to 
us in perception as having aspects that, right now, we cannot see, then any science of 
consciousness must respect and account for that profile. 
        
On the other hand, the causal profiles discovered by cognitive science may sometimes lead us 
to revise our conception of what the phenomena under investigation are. McDowell’s (1994) 
own example of such enabling-to-constitutive influence is (something like) the following. (I 
say ‘something like’ because I have assembled the example I am about to give out of more 
than one passage in McDowell’s discussion.) Imagine that there is some creature that, as far 
as our pre-scientific observations of its behaviour go, seems to enjoy a rich kind of perceptual 
contact with the world. Scientists then open up the head of that creature only to discover that 
there is nothing more complex driving its behaviour than a lump of homogenous jelly. Such a 
discovery would arguably be followed by a downgrading, within our constitutive 
understanding, of the creature’s world-inhabiting competence. A less dramatic (but 
comfortingly actual) example of enabling-to-constitutive influence (cited by Cappuccio and 
Wheeler, 2010) concerns recent experiments on mirror neurons. These experiments have 
influenced the phenomenological understanding of motor intentionality and intersubjectivity 
by suggesting that an agent’s own motor competences enrich and actively modulate her 
perception, recognition and categorization of intentional actions, endowing her with a 
prereflective understanding of the intentions of other agents (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007; 
see De Preester, 2008, for an analysis in which a consideration of mirror neuron research is 
used explicitly to drive the phenomenological-level claim that Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
self-other understanding as world-mediated presupposes a Husserlian notion of pairing or 
bodily similarity). Enabling-to-constitutive influence in the vicinity of phenomenology has 
even been incorporated explicitly into a proposed research methodology. In Gallagher’s 
(2003) front-loaded phenomenology, the results of phenomenological analysis are tested 
experimentally, and the experimental outcomes are then used to confirm, refute, revise or 
extend that phenomenological analysis. (Gallagher’s specific example concerns the empirical 
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testing of a phenomenologically established distinction between one’s sense of being the 
agent of an action and one’s sense of ownership of one’s body; see (Gallagher and Zahavi, 
2008, p.39).)              
 
About now, some readers of this chapter will want to complain that none of my examples of 
the phenomenological engagement with cognitive science concern Heidegger’s own 
hermeneutic phenomenological framework, a framework which, as Ratcliffe and Rehberg 
have shown us, might well engender hostile diplomatic relations with cognitive science. 
Time, then, to address this shortfall.  
 
Card carrying Heideggerians and their intellectual brethren who have reflected explicitly on 
the possibility of a productive relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science 
have sometimes argued for a one-way constraint from the former to the latter, on the sort of 
grounds already mentioned, namely that since “phenomenology tells us about the phenomena 
of human experience, its results ought to be relevant to the human sciences” (Kelly’s report 
of a view expressed by Dreyfus; Kelly, 2000, p.161). I suggest, however, that Heidegger 
himself, in relation to the scientific research on human experience and behaviour that was 
available in his time (branches of anthropology, psychology and biology), not only made 
ample conceptual room for something very like the two-way intelligible interplay advocated 
by McDowell, he also had a more developed account than McDowell of how that interplay is 
supposed to work. The interpretation of Heidegger that I am about to reiterate (it appears in a 
somewhat less developed form in Wheeler, 2005) is, I freely admit, controversial in places, 
but I cannot help that. It seems to me to be the only way to make sense of the conjunction of 
the following two passages from Being and Time, each of which, in my view, isolates one of 
the different directions of influence (constitutive-to-enabling, enabling-to-constitutive) that 
the McDowellian interplay involves.    
 
[The] ontological foundations [of anthropology, psychology, and biology] can 
never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material... 
they are always ‘there’ already, even when that empirical material simply gets 
collected. (Heidegger, 1927, p.75) 
 
[T]he positive sciences neither ‘can’ nor should wait for the ontological labours 
of philosophy to be done… the further course of research will not take the form 
of an ‘advance’ but will be accomplished by recapitulating what has already been 
ontically discovered, and by purifying it in a way which is ontologically more 
transparent. (Heidegger, 1927, p.76) 
 
Let’s consider these passages in turn. To understand the first we need to recognize that, for 
Heidegger, ontological analysis is the making explicit of the essential structure and the 
conditions of possibility of the phenomena of human experience. In other words, it is the kind 
of constitutive analysis carried out by phenomenology. Moreover, according to Heidegger, 
any empirical science (and that includes anthropology, psychology, biology or cognitive 
science) will be structured in such a way that, in order to deliver its distinctive species of 
enabling understanding, it must assume certain basic concepts and principles – the 
ontological foundations – that determine the constitutive character of its target phenomena. In 
much cognitive science, for example, some notion of internal representation is assumed that 
shapes the subsequent empirical study of mind. These ontological foundations, Heidegger 
tells us, cannot simply amount to further empirical hypotheses. That is, they cannot be 
delivered in a fully articulated form as a straightforward output of a distinctively scientific 
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methodology. This makes prima facie sense, since those foundations are presupposed by the 
empirical research in question. Crucially, however, it does not follow, from the fact that the 
ontological foundations of a science are not on all fours with the ordinary empirical 
hypotheses of that science, that those foundations are somehow wholly independent of the 
ongoing empirical research. And that’s where the second passage from Being and Time 
comes in.   
 
Here is something that Heidegger doesn’t quite say in that second passage, but which I take it 
is strongly suggested by his talk of empirical science not needing to wait for philosophy and 
of phenomenological research (which is how I read the phrase “the further course of 
research” – see below) as delivering an ontologically purer form of what has already been 
ontically (i.e. scientifically) discovered. As we have seen, for Heidegger, any particular 
example of empirical science can take place only on the basis of certain ontological 
presuppositions. If the presuppositions in play are fruitful generators of predictively and 
explanatorily powerful empirical models, then the ordinary dynamic of scientific research 
will maintain their presence at the heart of that science, as something akin to the defining 
concepts and principles of a Kuhnian paradigm, or the hard core of a Lakatosian research 
programme (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1977). If, by contrast, the presuppositions in play become 
identified as the source of stalled empirical models that consistently fail to account for new or 
historically recalcitrant data, then the science itself will tend to revise those presuppositions, 
perhaps in a revolutionary, paradigm-shifting transition. Kuhn and Lakatos said that too. If all 
this is right, one might wonder what there is left for philosophy to do. But nothing about the 
proposed picture suggests that the ontological foundations of a science cannot be 
strengthened or criticized by philosophical (e.g. phenomenological) argument. Moreover, 
according to Heidegger (and now we’re back with the first of the target quotations), such 
foundations will tend to remain buried or impure without the benefit of philosophical 
(phenomenological) amplification and clarification.   
 
The overall intellectual dynamic just sketched, which, as I have argued, is implied by 
Heidegger’s remarks, requires that any particular set of science-shaping ontological 
foundations (any particular presupposed constitutive understanding) must, in principle, be 
sensitive to, and modifiable in the wake of, the success or failure of the empirical models 
which those foundations support. In other words, for Heidegger, good empirical science 
(good enabling understanding) depends, in part, on good ontological foundations (good 
constitutive understanding), and while the ontological foundations of a science may be 
articulated, clarified and criticized by philosophy (by phenomenology), they may also be 
revised in the light of ongoing empirical scientific research. What this tells us is that the 
phenomenology-involving version of the McDowellian intelligible interplay, the structure for 
which we have been searching, is indeed fully present in Heidegger’s framework. Moreover, 
if we squint just hard enough, Heidegger may be seen as recommending a broadly Kuhnian or 
perhaps Lakatosian model for how that interplay functions.     
 
One might, I suppose, object to my analysis here by challenging my reading of ‘research’ in 
the target quotation as indicating phenomenological research, but if one reads it as indicating 
scientific research instead, it is hard to make sense of the tasks of purification and increasing 
transparency that, Heidegger argues, will achieve the ‘advance’ in question. In Heidegger’s 
thinking those tasks certainly seem to be the responsibility of philosophy, and in particular of 
ontological analysis. A more substantive objection would claim that I have ignored a critical 
aspect of Heidegger’s framework, by considering regional ontology (focussed on the sets of 
ontological foundations that determine how sense-making works in local contexts, for 
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example within particular sciences) in isolation from its dependence on fundamental ontology 
(focussed on what it is that unites and makes possible all our varied and diverse modes of 
sense-making, including our regional ontologies). Heidegger is laudably clear that regional 
ontology depends on fundamental ontology. As he puts it, “the question of Being aims… at 
ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine 
beings as beings of such and such a type, and, in doing so, already operate with an 
understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are 
prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations” (Heidegger, 1927, p.31). 
But if regional ontology depends ultimately on fundamental ontology, then for all I’ve said 
there remains an empirically inviolable foundation to distinctively human existence (the 
human capacity for sense-making) that lies beyond the reach of cognitive science. I am 
unmoved by this supposed worry, in part for general reasons concerning the commitments of 
naturalism that I will discuss in a moment, but also because Heidegger is adamant that the 
basic condition for intelligibility that fundamental ontology will articulate does not exist as an 
ethereal metaphysical something that lies beyond entities in the realm of what Sheehan 
(2001) calls “Big Being”. Rather, in a catchy little Heideggerian phrase, being is always the 
being of some entity. There is much to be said about what this claim means, but I see no way 
of making sense of it while simultaneously insulating the results of fundamental ontology 
from the results of regional ontology. And given that, on Heidegger’s account, regional 
ontology is subject to empirical impact (although not, of course, to scientific reduction), 
fundamental ontology must be too.      
 
So, according to me, the Heideggerian framework, when interpreted correctly, embraces a 
neo-McDowellian intelligible interplay between constitutive understanding or, more 
specifically, phenomenology, and enabling understanding or, more specifically, cognitive 
science. Say I’m right. What are the consequences for the arguments that Ratcliffe and 
Rehberg present against a Heideggerian cognitive science?  
 
To hold Ratcliffe at bay, the emerging Heideggerian picture must be rendered compatible 
with naturalism. As noted earlier, the guiding thought of naturalism is that philosophy should 
be continuous with empirical science. To evaluate whether or not we have the desired 
compatibility, then, we need an answer to the following question: how is the notion of 
continuity that is at the heart of naturalism to be understood? There is no univocal answer to 
this question. Rather, the stripe of one’s naturalism is determined by the particular account of 
continuity that one gives. For example, a certain kind of hard-headed naturalist about 
psychological phenomena might understand continuity in terms of the reduction of pre-
scientifically identified psychological phenomena to scientifically identified states and 
processes. If, along with thinkers like McDowell (1996), one thinks of pre-scientifically 
identified psychological phenomena as occupying a logical space of reasons (of justification), 
and of science as offering explanations that come from outside that space (maybe, from a 
realm of law, although see McDowell, 2009), then the reductionist claim that one can give an 
exhaustive account of the former in terms of the latter generates what McDowell (1996, p.67) 
calls bald naturalism. However, this strong reading of continuity is not mandatory. For 
example, we might read continuity with natural science in what is perhaps the weakest 
possible way, that is, as mere consistency with empirical science (Wheeler, 2005). In this case 
we avoid any blanket demand for scientific-reductionist explanations of psychological 
phenomena, while allowing for such explanations in specific cases. (For a pretty much 
equivalent conception of naturalism, see Elton’s (2003) interpretation of Dennett.) Let’s call 
this position minimal naturalism. (There is an interpretative question that I don’t examine 
here, as to how the minimal naturalism that I favour, and that I take to be compatible with 
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McDowell’s account of the relationship between constitutive and enabling explanation, 
relates to the brand of naturalism to which McDowell himself subscribes, a brand that turns 
on the claim that although human sensibility exists within nature, a complete constitutive 
account of that sensibility cannot be given using concepts from outside the logical space of 
reasons (McDowell, 2006); for critical discussion of McDowell’s naturalism, see e.g. 
(Haddock, 2009).)        
 
Despite its deliberately modest character, minimal naturalism still has enough bite to count as 
a genuine form of naturalism. That’s because the consistency condition, as I understand it, 
involves a constraint running from science to philosophy, to the effect that if and when there 
is a genuine clash between philosophy and empirical science (in the sense that philosophy 
demands the presence of some entity, state, or process which is judged to be inconsistent with 
empirical science), then it’s philosophy and not science that must ultimately concede, through 
withdrawal or revision of its claims. The naturalistic pressure that cognitive science exerts on 
phenomenology is just a special case of this constraint. (My way of unpacking the 
consistency condition owes a debt to Huw Price’s formulation of what he calls subject 
naturalism as being the view that “[s]cience tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and 
if the claims and ambitions of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to 
give way” (Price, 2004, p.4). This is not to claim, of course, that Price’s subject naturalism is 
equivalent to my minimal naturalism; it is not.) I include the qualification ‘ultimately’ in my 
formulation because not even the most enthusiastic naturalist should expect good philosophy 
to capitulate to bad science. Strictly speaking, then, the constraint on the table ought to be 
that if there is a clash between philosophy and some eminently well-supported science, then it 
is philosophy that should concede, through the withdrawal or revision of its claims, although 
there will often be room for negotiation. This constraint secures, but needs nothing more 
radical than, the kind of enabling-to-constitutive influence that the Heideggerian version of 
the McDowellian intelligible interplay requires. But what about the other direction of travel? 
Is minimal naturalism compatible with the kind of constitutive-to-enabling influence that 
Heideggerian thinking demands?     
 
The first thing to note is that although minimal naturalism makes cognitive science relevant 
to our phenomenological account of Dasein, it does not usher in cognitive scientism. In other 
words, because it stops a long way short of reductionism, minimal naturalism does not 
demand that a complete cognitive science of Dasein would be a complete understanding of 
Dasein, although it would be a complete enabling understanding. I take it that this is ‘merely’ 
a more general expression of the thought that all right-thinking philosophers and 
psychologists have concerning, say, evolutionary-psychological theorizing about the 
mechanisms that underlie our moral reasoning. One can surely hold that such theorizing tells 
us much that is important about the way human beings reason about ethical issues, including 
by suggesting, or by placing limits on, the kinds of factors to which a constitutive account 
ought to count us as being sensitive, without also holding that evolutionary fitness determines 
what a human being should – or even, given rational argument or other contextual influences, 
will – judge to be morally correct. In short, where a constitutive claim could, in principle, 
clash with science, the consistency constraint will operate, but not all claims are like that. So, 
with continuity understood in terms of consistency, the fact that there are principled limits on 
what cognitive science might explain is no longer a threat to naturalism, so it is no longer a 
threat to a Heideggerian cognitive science.   
 
It might seem that this argument doesn’t go quite far enough. After all, Ratcliffe’s argument 
cites a phenomenon, our sense of belonging to the world, that, according to Heideggerian 
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thinking, is presupposed by cognitive science, in the sense that it is a transcendental condition 
of the distinctive mode of revealing entities that is characteristic of cognitive science. It is this 
very transcendality that is supposed to make Dasein resistant to naturalistic understanding. In 
fact, however, the threat-level is not increased by this reminder. According to the intelligible 
interplay view that I have attributed to Heidegger, the conditions that are transcendentally 
presupposed by any particular scientific explanation or model (the structures and elements of 
regional and fundamental ontology), are not immune to revision, or even perhaps rejection, in 
the light of the results of the empirical scientific research that they make possible. Indeed, 
while there might well be philosophical notions of the transcendental that succeed in 
screening off the conditions of possibility of human experience from scientific influence 
altogether, it is mysterious how the domesticated and historicized notion of the transcendental 
that functions in Heidegger’s phenomenology could have that effect. After all, according to 
Heidegger, the conditions of possibility of specific enactments of sense-making are 
concretely embedded in history (historicality is part of the existential constitution of Dasein), 
and thus may change as societies change, including, presumably, as a result of scientific 
change, given that science is itself a sense-making activity embedded in human history. So, in 
the light of the feedback loops in play, it is perfectly consistent with Heideggerian thinking to 
hold that the details of our phenomenological understanding of our sense of belonging to the 
world could be reshaped in the light of cognitive-scientific research on the enabling 
conditions that causally generate that sense of familiarity. In the next section we shall begin 
to investigate the cognitive science of belonging to the world.         
 
Before that, however, we need to revisit Rehberg’s claim that the objectifying mode of sense-
making which, according to Heideggerian thinking, is an essential characteristic of cognitive 
science, renders cognitive science inherently incapable of illuminating Dasein’s being-in-the-
world. The minimally naturalistic Heideggerian picture that I have been painting deflects this 
objection too. To see how, it will be useful to reconstruct Rehberg’s claim in the language of 
the distinction between constitutive understanding and enabling understanding which, as I 
have argued, is a keystone of Heidegger’s own reflections on phenomenology and the human-
related sciences. Put in such terms, the Heideggerian viewpoint is that the dominant Western 
way of inhabiting science is one in which the objectifying explanations of cognitive science 
are offered as constitutive accounts of human activity, that is, as entailing a general, 
cognitive-scientistic reduction of phenomenological (constitutive) understanding to scientific 
(enabling) understanding in the vicinity of human psychological life. It is certainly true that, 
on Heideggerian grounds, we should resist this kind of general objectifying reduction as 
obscuring the essential character and dynamics of human sense-making. But that is not to 
resist the idea of a Heideggerian cognitive science. Far from it. It is to resist a certain manner 
of inhabiting cognitive science, a manner that is not mandated by the minimal naturalism that 
I have argued will accompany any cognitive science with genuinely Heideggerian credentials. 
It is possible for the objectifying, causal-enabling explanations of human behaviour that 
cognitive science delivers to inform phenomenological analysis in the fashion required by our 
naturalistic intelligible interplay without there being any threat that what is thereby 
established is the kind of objectified levelling of human being against which Heidegger warns 
us. Moreover, this is all possible without cognitive science surrendering any of its essential 
characteristics as part of modern science, and thus ceasing to be a science.                               
 
The first round of my self-interested defence is now complete, with the very idea of a 
Heideggerian cognitive science emerging largely unscathed. Round two, in which I shall 
respond to criticisms by Dreyfus and Rietveld, will take a rather different form. That’s 
because Dreyfus and Rietveld agree with me that a research programme worthy of the name 
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‘Heideggerian cognitive science’ is possible. The problems that they wish to lay at my door 
concern the details of my particular account.  
 
4. Dasein in the Lab: the Heideggerian Cognitive Science of Relevance Sensitivity 
 
What would a Heideggerian cognitive science look like? That, of course, is far too big and 
complicated a question to address in the few pages I now have available. So here is a 
substitute: what would a Heideggerian cognitive science of human sensitivity to relevance 
look like? In other words, from a Heideggerian perspective – indeed, from within the kind of 
minimally naturalistic Heideggerian framework sketched above (or something essentially 
similar) – what are the causal mechanisms that enable human sensitivity to relevance? Why is 
this an interesting question? The first thing to note is that even in the sort of dynamically 
shifting and open-ended scenarios in which we often find ourselves, human beings are 
extraordinarily proficient at maintaining psychological and behavioural focus on what is 
contextually relevant in a situation, while ignoring what is contextually irrelevant. For the 
most part anyway, we think and act in ways that are fluidly and flexibly keyed to context-
dependent relevance. Since this impressive capacity is undoubtedly central to human 
intelligence, cognitive science should be able to arrive at a credible enabling understanding of 
it – or rather, if minimal naturalism is correct, it should. The fact is, however, that a range of 
prominent thinkers in and around cognitive science, from Fodor (1983) at the classical end of 
the spectrum to Dreyfus (e.g. 1990, 1992, this volume) at the Heidegger-influenced other end, 
have claimed that cognitive science has historically failed to meet this expectation.  
 
The empirical evidence often cited in favour of this judgment is the seemingly recalcitrant 
nature of two relevance-driven problems – the commonsense knowledge problem and frame 
problem – that have arguably plagued work in artificial intelligence (see e.g. Dreyfus, this 
volume). For our purposes, what matters is that these problems plausibly have a similar 
structure. Ignoring many important details, that structure looks like this. Orthodox cognitive 
science is built on the claim that intelligence is a matter of building, retrieving, manipulating 
and transforming suites of representational states and processes. Against this theoretical 
backdrop, the natural thought when it comes to the issue of relevance is that the intelligent 
agent should specify and track relevance, by systematically representing the key features of 
the contexts in which she finds herself. These context-specifying inner representations will in 
turn determine which first-order inner representations are relevant and so should be pressed 
into behaviour-guiding service. Unfortunately this strategy has to square up to a serious 
difficulty, since the putatively context-specifying second-order representations to which it 
appeals will need to have their own contextual relevance specified by other, third-order 
representations; these third-order representations will need to have their contextual relevance 
specified by fourth-order representations; and so on. The result is a computationally 
debilitating infinite regress (see e.g. Dreyfus 1992, pp.288-9).  
 
What the foregoing considerations indicate is that cognitive science faces a problem of 
relevance, a problem of how to explain human sensitivity to relevance scientifically. So far, 
so good (or, perhaps, bad). What really concerns us here, however, is the way in which 
Heideggerian philosophy might be pressed into service to provide a diagnosis of, and a 
response to, the root cause of this difficulty.  
 
Dreyfus’s seminal, Heidegger-influenced analysis of why cognitive science has historically 
foundered in the face of the problem of relevance is well-known, and I do not intend to repeat 
all its details here. (Dreyfus gives a lively and compelling summary in his chapter for this 
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volume; for further details and discussion, see e.g. Dreyfus, 1990, 1992; Wheeler, 2005, 
2008, 2010b; Cappuccio and Wheeler, 2010; Rietveld, this volume.) In any case, in the 
dispute with which we are concerned, it is agreed ground between Dreyfus, Rietveld and me 
(more accurately, Rietveld and I agree with Dreyfus) that the orthodox cognitive-scientific 
approach to the problem of relevance won’t work and that an alternative approach is needed 
that is shaped by Heideggerian philosophy, or at least by the phenomenological tradition that 
Heidegger helped launch. That said, however, a key point in Dreyfus’s critique of orthodox 
cognitive science (a point to be identified soon) will continue to be important in what follows, 
because Dreyfus’s critical response to my version of Heideggerian cognitive science turns 
largely on the thought that I have failed to take on board what really matters in Heidegger’s 
thinking, and that, because of this failure, the positive account of relevance-sensitivity that I 
end up giving does not put sufficient conceptual distance between itself and the account on 
offer from orthodox cognitive science, with predictably disastrous results. In short, as 
Dreyfus sees things, my lack of success in being sufficiently Heideggerian undermines not 
only my Heideggerian credentials but also my ability to offer a convincing response to the 
problem of relevance in any of its manifestations. That explains why Dreyfus describes my 
approach as advocating a “pseudo-Heideggerian AI” (Dreyfus, this volume, p.??) and 
concludes that I ultimately provide “no solution or dissolution of the [frame] problem” 
(Dreyfus, this volume, pp.??). If Dreyfus is right, I really have messed up.  
 
To make a start on bringing the issues into proper view, I need to recap certain features of my 
version of Heideggerian cognitive science (Wheeler, 2005, 2008, 2010b). In Division 1 of 
Being and Time, Heidegger (1927) famously identifies three different modes of encountering 
entities: readiness-to-hand, un-readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand. Some aspects of this 
three-way distinction were described earlier, but now we need to add in more detail. (In truth, 
some of this added detail goes a little beyond what Heidegger himself actually says, but my 
intention at such moments is to mine the implications of Heidegger’s own presentation, not to 
graft on alien ideas.) The mode of readiness-to-hand is instantiated in the online, hitch-free, 
skilled manipulation of equipment in certain sorts of context-specific practical tasks. In the 
domain of readiness-to-hand, the subject-object distinction, and thus representational 
consciousness, plays no experiential part. For example, while engaged in trouble-free text 
editing, the proficient typist will have no conscious recognition of the keyboard or the 
monitor, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Nor 
indeed will he have any experience of himself as a subject over and against his ongoing 
activity. Dreyfus (this volume) calls this kind of activity absorbed coping, and notes that it is 
regulated by (i) the human expert’s capacity to sense deviations from a contextually 
determined optimal balance with her environment, and (ii) her ability to smoothly adapt her 
behaviour to improve her performance and thus reduce her sense of being out of balance.  
 
When the kind of smooth adaptive accommodation that characterizes absorbed coping is 
disturbed by broken or malfunctioning equipment, discovered-to-be-missing equipment, or 
in-the-way equipment, our encounters with entities enter the new domain of un-readiness-to-
hand, a domain in which entities are revealed phenomenologically as presenting context-
specific problems to be solved. Skilled activity is consequently reconfigured as context-
specific practical problem solving. When revealed as un-ready-to-hand, an entity will be 
experienced in terms of properties that are, for example, action-specific, egocentric and 
dependent on a particular context of activity. So, for example, the online, task-engaged 
skilled navigator, confronted by obstacles to be avoided, may represent the external 
environment as an egocentrically defined space in which those obstacles appear only as 
regions to be avoided, positioned in terms of roughly specified bearings relative to her own 
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body. In this way, un-readiness-to-hand involves the emergence of a proto-subject-object 
distinction that becomes more pronounced with increasing levels of disturbance, until 
eventually the entities under study are phenomenologically removed from the action-oriented 
settings of everyday equipmental practice and are thereby revealed as fully-fledged present-
at-hand objects, that is, as the bearers of certain context-independent determinate or 
measurable properties (size in metres, weight in kilos etc.). The disclosure of entities as 
present-at-hand, which, as we have seen, is the characteristic mode of revealing of science, is 
accompanied by the full emergence of a subject over and against an objective universe, and 
thus of full-blown representational consciousness. So, for example, the disengaged reasoner, 
reflecting offline on a navigation problem, may represent the external environment by way of 
something like a Cartesian co-ordinate system in which the objective shape, orientation and 
positions of detected obstacles are plotted.  
 
What kinds of causal mechanisms might cognitive science identify as enabling the modes of 
encounter just identified? Since our interest here is in the human capacity for fluid and 
flexible context-dependent sensitivity to relevance, and since the domain of presence-at-hand 
is a field of disengaged reflection on context-independent objects whose contextual relevance 
always remains to be determined (more on this later), I shall concentrate on the kind of 
contextually relevant skilled practical activity that is manifested in ready-to-hand and un-
ready-to-hand scenarios, scenarios in which, as Heidegger (1927) illuminates things, human 
experience is of being thrown in a world that already matters to us, without there being any 
need for us to locate and specify that relevance. At this point we can use as our guide the (as I 
have argued) Heideggerian notion that there is an intelligible interplay between constitutive 
understanding and enabling understanding, and proceed to seek out candidate mechanisms 
that, in some interesting way, are structurally isomorphic counterparts to the 
phenomenologically identified structures described above (for a more careful justification of 
this appeal to structural isomorphisms, see Wheeler, 2005). The idea here is that we can 
neutralize the problem of relevance via a combination of Heideggerian phenomenology, 
through which we gain insight into the conditions of possibility of relevance-sensitive 
activity, and an empirically well-supported cognitive science which makes that 
phenomenological account intelligible from a mechanistic, causal-explanatory perspective.  
 
It is plausible (according to me anyway) that both the ready-to-hand phenomenon of 
nonrepresentational sensitivity to contextually specific relevant factors and the un-ready-to-
hand phenomenon of representationally mediated, context-specific problem solving may be 
enabled by mechanisms that I have described previously as situated special purpose adaptive 
couplings or, more catchily, as thrown machines (Wheeler, 2008). Thrown machines are 
closely coupled brain-body-environment mechanisms that, in effect, avoid the problem of 
having to determine what is relevant in a situation – and thus arguably solve the problem of 
relevance – because they are activated correctly only in the presence of the right, contextually 
relevant input. As I understand such thrown machines, they exhibit a kind of enabling-level 
intrinsic context-sensitivity. To illustrate this idea, here is an old but compelling example 
which I have used before (see e.g. Wheeler, 2004).  
 
The evolutionary roboticists Harvey et al. (1994) set artificial evolution the task of designing 
a robot control system, comprising an artificial neural network and some rather basic visual 
receptors, that would enable a mobile agent to approach a triangle but not a rectangle in 
wildly varying lighting conditions. The evolutionary outcome was striking. Two visual 
receptors were positioned geometrically such that visual fixation on the oblique edge of the 
triangle would typically result in a pair of visual signals (i.e., receptor 1 = low, receptor 2 = 
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high) which was different from such pairs produced (almost) anywhere else in the arena. The 
robot would move in a straight line if the pair of visual signals was appropriate for fixation on 
the triangle, and in a rotational movement otherwise. Thus if the robot was fixated on the 
triangle, it would tend to move in a straight line towards it. Otherwise it would simply rotate 
until it did locate the triangle. Occasionally (and this explains the parenthetical ‘almost’ a few 
sentences ago) the robot would fixate erroneously on one edge of the rectangle, because, from 
certain angles, that edge would result in a qualitatively similar pair of visual signals being 
generated as would have been generated by the sloping edge of the triangle. Perturbed into 
straight line movement, the robot would begin to approach the rectangle. However, the 
looming rectangle would, unlike a looming triangle, produce a change in the relative values 
of the visual inputs (receptor 1 would be forced into a high state of activation), and the robot 
would be perturbed into a rotational movement. During this rotation, the robot would almost 
invariably refixate on the correct target, the triangle.  
 
Here is a way of interpreting the activity of this thrown machine that, if we allow ourselves 
the obviously hazardous but potentially enlightening generalization to human activity, 
underlines its power as a model for an enabling account of absorbed coping. A mechanistic 
sensitivity to deviations from a contextually determined optimal balance with the 
environment (deviations from successful triangle tracking) elicit smooth adjustments to 
behaviour without the need for mediating representational control. Because of the specific 
nature of the adaptive dynamical coupling instantiated, there is never a stage of processing in 
which the mechanism ‘pauses’ to construct a map of its environment or produce a represented 
plan of action, no matter how partial, perspectival, rudimentary or short-lived one thinks the 
most minimal examples of such representational structures could be.  
 
Although the thrown machine just described is nonrepresentational in character, the special-
purpose and closely-coupled aspects of the mechanisms in question do not, in and of 
themselves, prevent the deployment of certain kinds of representational control strategies. So 
the presence of enabling-level representations is not necessarily in tension with intrinsic 
context-dependence. Put more positively, the point is that representational elements may 
partially underlie the phenomenon of context-dependent skilled practical problem solving in 
the domain of un-readiness-to-hand. (Supporting analyses for the claims made here may be 
found in Wheeler, 2005, 2008, 2010b; for an innovative empirical study that seeks to isolate 
the psychological signature of the transition between readiness-to-hand and unreadiness-to-
hand, although admittedly without thereby endorsing the specific, representation-introducing 
aspect of my account, see Dotov et al., 2010.) Robots whose behaviour-generating inner 
elements arguably realize an analogue of the representational profile that, as Heidegger’s 
analysis suggests, is phenomenologically distinctive of un-readiness-to-hand – in that they 
encode properties that are action-specific, egocentric and dependent on a particular context of 
activity – have been developed within (what I take to be) a ‘thrown-machine’ approach 
pursued by, among many others, Mataric (1991) and Franceschini et al. (1992). Indeed, the 
Franceschini et al. robot just referenced represents obstacles precisely as (to adapt my 
previous description) regions to be avoided, positioned in terms of roughly specified bearings 
relative to the robot’s own body. Enabling-level representations with the kind of profile just 
sketched have been dubbed action-oriented representations (see e.g. Wheeler, 2005). 
  
So much for the problem of relevance, one might think. At this juncture, however, there is a 
serious complication to be acknowledged, namely that the problem of relevance, which I 
have been treating as a unitary beast, actually has a two-dimensional structure (Wheeler, 
2008, 2010b). Its intra-context dimension challenges us to say how a naturalistically 
17 
 
discharged system is able to achieve appropriate, flexible and fluid action within a context. It 
is this intra-context dimension of the problem for which thrown machines, as I have 
characterized them, provide a credible enabling understanding. But secondly, there is an 
inter-context dimension to the problem. This challenges us to say how a naturalistically 
discharged system is able to flexibly and fluidly switch between an open-ended sequence of 
contexts in a relevance-sensitive manner. For reasons that will become clear, I remain less 
confident regarding the enabling understanding of such context-switching, although, as I have 
argued previously (Wheeler, 2005, 2008, 2010a, b), part of the solution may well lie with 
mechanisms which realize a form of causation that Andy Clark once dubbed continuous 
reciprocal causation (Clark, 1997). Continuous reciprocal causation is causation that 
involves multiple simultaneous interactions and complex dynamic feedback loops, such that 
(a) the causal contribution of each systemic component partially determines, and is partially 
determined by, the causal contributions of large numbers of other systemic components, and 
(b) those contributions may change radically over time. This species of causation plausibly 
bestows on a mechanistic system a certain kind of large-scale holistic flexibility, a flexibility 
that seems to be ripe to account, in part, for the fluid context-switching highlighted by the 
inter-context frame problem. More on this, with an example, in a moment.  
 
That completes my brief recap of the salient aspects of my version of Heideggerian cognitive 
science. So now, what precisely might be wrong with it?  
 
5. Representations and Background Coping 
    
At the heart of the disagreement between Dreyfus and me are two intertwined issues, namely 
(i) the nature, status and consequences of representational explanation in the cognitive 
science of relevance-sensitivity, and (ii) the existence, character and contribution to human 
relevance-sensitivity of a phenomenon that Dreyfus calls background coping. 
 
Dreyfus (this volume, pp.??) deplores what he calls my “cognitivist misreading” of 
Heidegger for its appeal to representations and (as Dreyfus sees it) its associated assumption 
that skilled human activity can be treated exhaustively as problem-solving. Although I might 
take issue with the latter claim – since I don’t treat absorbed coping as problem-solving (see 
above) – that is a minor interpretative quibble. The real action here concerns my (as I see it) 
Heideggerian thought that action-oriented representations figure in the kind of relevance-
sensitivity that characterizes practical problem-solving in the domain of the un-ready-to-
hand. It is important to note that this is not (or not only) an argument over who gets to wear 
the Heidegger t-shirt. The full scope of Dreyfus’s objection is that there are good 
Heideggerian reasons for thinking that the problem of relevance is, at least in part, an artefact 
of representationalism. As he puts it, “for Heidegger, all representational accounts are part of 
the problem” (Dreyfus, this volume, p.??). Perhaps the central consideration in support of this 
claim is Heidegger’s somewhat sketchy treatment of what he calls value-predicates 
(Heidegger, 1927, p.132; for discussion, see Dreyfus, 1990; Wheeler, 2005). In effect, value-
predicates are representations of context-dependent features. And Heidegger argues that 
adding such representations to context-independent, present-at-hand primitives (e.g. to raw 
sense data or, to give the argument a more contemporary tone, to light-intensity gradients at 
the retina) can never be the ultimate source of relevance, since each such representation is 
itself a present-at-hand structure that needs to have its contextual relevance determined. From 
a Heideggerian perspective, this is the fundamental root of the cognitively incapacitating 
infinite regress that, as we saw earlier, arguably thwarts the orthodox cognitive-scientific 
approach to the problem of relevance. 
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Given all this, Dreyfus’s criticism might seem to be that because I fail to follow Heidegger’s 
recommendation, which (the treatment of value-predicates might suggest) is to do away with 
representations altogether, my so-called Heideggerian cognitive science will inherit 
something akin to the difficulties that have plagued orthodox cognitive science. There is 
certainly textual evidence for this interpretation of Dreyfus. For example, he writes that 
“Wheeler’s approach… by introducing flexible action-oriented representations, like any 
representational approach has to face the frame problem head on” (Dreyfus, this volume, 
pp.??). If this were Dreyfus’s settled position, however, it would seemingly be refuted by the 
fact that, as we have seen, there are examples of representation-involving thrown machines 
that, because they operate on the basis of close coupling and special-purpose activation, don’t 
succumb to the problem of relevance. Crucially, the action-oriented representations that 
figure in such machines are not designed to perform the function of specifying context 
(context is intrinsic to the operative mechanisms; see above). This suggests that the structure 
of the orthodox problem of relevance is not an artefact of representationalism per se, but 
rather an artefact of the idea that context can be representationally specified. So Dreyfus’s 
criticism, as I am currently understanding it, looks to be unfounded. On reflection, however, 
things can’t be quite that simple. That is, and despite the occasional rhetorical flourish, 
Dreyfus cannot hold (and cannot hold that Heidegger would hold) that the mere introduction 
of representations anywhere into an account of what constitutes and enables relevance-
sensitivity results in that account becoming impaled on the problem of relevance. And that’s 
because Dreyfus himself allows that un-readiness to hand and the richly relevance-sensitive 
skilled activity that accompanies it have a representational signature (see e.g. Dreyfus, this 
volume, p.??). Dreyfus’s critical point, then, is more subtle. It is that the representational 
signature in question plays no interesting role in accounting for relevance-sensitivity. This 
deflationary judgment turns on a Heideggerian claim to which, Dreyfus suggests, I am all but 
blind. That claim is that “all coping, including unready-to-hand coping, takes place on the 
background of [a] basic nonrepresentational, holistic, absorbed, kind of intentionality, which 
Heidegger calls being-in-the-world” (Dreyfus, this volume, pp.??).  
 
What, then, is this all-important phenomenon of the background? Here is a brief sketch (for a 
more detailed treatment, see Cappuccio and Wheeler, forthcoming). In the Heideggerian 
framework, the significance of the world into which human activity is thrown is neither fully 
represented within the practical knowledge that enables Dasein to negotiate situations, nor is 
it fully representable in some ideal theoretical register. This is because that structure 
encompasses a vast and indeterminate web of implicit preconditions for sense making, “an 
unexplicated horizon” or background, providing “the vantage point from out of which” every 
experience matters to one in certain way (Taylor, 1993, p.325). Our epistemic engagement 
with the background thus amounts to a knowing how to navigate one’s way around those 
psychological, social and cultural structures of one’s world that are implicitly presupposed 
by, rather than on open display in, concrete examples of skilled activity. Dreyfus (this 
volume) calls our familiarity with, and our smooth navigation of, these holistic and 
unrepresented patterns of significance background coping. Background coping may thus be 
closely allied with the Heideggerian sense of belonging to the world identified by Ratcliffe 
(see above).  
 
So, phenomenological analysis reveals background coping to be a nonrepresentational, 
transcendental feature of human existence that, as a matter of ontology, underlies both 
nonrepresentational absorbed coping and representational practical problem solving. From 
the vantage point of a Heideggerian cognitive science, what remains to be given is an 
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enabling explanation of this fundamental capacity. When Dreyfus (this volume) turns his 
attention to this outstanding issue, he cites with approval a scientific research programme that 
(as I see it) emphasizes the very phenomenon of continuous reciprocal causation whose 
potential for underpinning large-scale holistic flexibility I highlighted earlier. That 
programme is the neurodynamical framework developed by Freeman (2000). (For remarks by 
Freeman which all but prefigure the language of continuous reciprocal causation, see 
Freeman, 2000, p.22; quoted by Dreyfus, this volume, pp.??). In Freeman’s research (more 
on which in a moment), the brain is conceived as, broadly speaking, a nonrepresentational 
dynamical system primed by past experience to actively pick up and enrich significance, a 
system whose constantly shifting attractor landscape causally explains how newly 
encountered significances may interact with existing patterns of inner organization to create 
new global structures for interpreting and responding to stimuli. With this candidate for an 
enabling understanding of background coping in place, the Dreyfusian version of 
Heideggerian cognitive science comes fully into view.   
 
Showing in detail how the representational un-ready-to-hand in all its forms 
depends upon a background of holistic, nonrepresentational coping is exactly the 
Heideggerian project and would, indeed, be the most important contribution that 
Heideggerian AI could make to Cognitive Science.  Indeed, a Heideggerian 
Cognitive Science would require working out an ontology, phenomenology, and 
brain model, that denies a basic role to any sort of representation – even action 
oriented ones – and defends a dynamical model… that gives a primordial place to 
equilibrium and in general to rich coupling. (Dreyfus, this volume, pp.??) 
 
One way for me to respond to Dreyfus’s critique would be for me to argue directly that there 
is a representational dimension to the way in which we navigate the background. I think that 
such an argument can be made, based on the way in which certain embodied routines, such as 
the preparatory exercises sometimes executed by sporting experts, reconfigure the 
background to promote future behavioural success while being interpretable as a species of 
action-oriented representation (Cappuccio and Wheeler, forthcoming). My strategy here, 
however, will be to argue that, when all the cards are on the table, neither Dreyfus nor I is 
currently in a position to offer a fully compelling Heideggerian cognitive science of 
relevance-sensitivity, but that my account fares better than Dreyfus’s and thus offers a 
reasonable platform for future thought. As we shall see, a crucial step in the reasoning by 
which I reach this conclusion will involve an examination of Rietveld’s objections to my 
views. 
 
Recall the inter-context problem of relevance, the problem of specifying the causal 
mechanisms that underlie flexible and fluid context-switching. According to Dreyfus’s 
analysis, such context-switching is encompassed by our capacity for background coping, a 
capacity distinguished phenomenologically by a broad implicit sensitivity to holistically 
structured global relevance and explained causally by something like Freeman-style 
dynamics. This explanatory package is on display in the following passage, in which Dreyfus 
draws on Freeman’s work to address the issue of context-switching. Dreyfus writes: 
 
If Freeman is right… our sense of other potentially relevant familiar situations on 
the horizon of the current situation [i.e., our readiness and capacity for context-
switching], might well be correlated with the fact that brain activity is not simply 
in one attractor basin at a time but is influenced by other attractor basins in the 
same landscape, as well as by other attractor landscapes which under what have 
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previously been experienced as relevant conditions are ready to draw current 
brain activity into themselves. According to Freeman, what makes us open to the 
horizonal influence of other attractors is that the whole system of attractor 
landscapes collapses and is rebuilt with each new rabbit sniff [Freeman has 
worked extensively on rabbit olfaction], or in our case, presumably with each 
shift in our attention. And after each collapse, a new landscape may be formed on 
the basis of new significant stimuli – a landscape in which, thanks to past 
experiences, a different attractor is active. (Dreyfus, this volume, pp.??)  
   
There are reasons to think that Dreyfus’s appeal to shifting attractor landscapes falls short of 
what is required (Wheeler, 2010a, b). The first thing to notice is that it remains unclear from 
the text in question whether the crucial reconfiguration of the neural attractor landscape is 
supposed to be (i) caused by the attentional shift (as might be suggested by the parallel with 
the rabbit sniff and the talk of a new landscape being formed “on the basis of new significant 
stimuli”) or (ii) the causal basis of the attentional shift (as might be suggested by the thought 
that the attractors in the landscape determine what we attend to). Either way, there is a worry. 
If (i) is the correct interpretation, then the shift in attention itself remains unexplained. But at 
least sometimes that shift in attention is presumably governed by, and thus presupposes, a 
grip on the way in which contexts of activity are changing. To that extent, then, Dreyfus’ 
suggestion begs the question. On the other hand, if (ii) is the correct interpretation, then it 
seems that we are still owed an explanation of how it is that, out of all the attractors in the 
pre-transition landscape that have been significant in the past, and that might have become 
active, it is the relevant one that is ultimately selected. Once again, it seems, the key question 
is being begged. 
 
If the foregoing worries are justified, Dreyfus’s favoured candidate for an enabling 
understanding of fluid and flexible context-switching is, at best, incomplete. Of course, the 
wily reader will be champing at the bit right now to point out that if Freeman-style 
neurodynamics are (as I have suggested) a species of continuous reciprocal causation, and if 
(as I have indicated) my own preferred candidate for a mechanism underlying context-
switching is one that instantiates continuous reciprocal causation, then Dreyfus and I look to 
be in the same (leaky) boat. There is undoubtedly something right about this. The fact that a 
machine may flexibly and holistically reconfigure itself on the basis of continuous reciprocal 
causation among its elements does not guarantee that the behaviours generated by that 
machine will remain contextually relevant. All that is assured is that the machine supports the 
kind of flexibility that, when harnessed appropriately (i.e. in relevance-sensitive ways), may 
help to generate fluid context-switching. In other words, although Dreyfus and I may be in 
possession of part of the story about how fluid and flexible context-switching is causally 
enabled, that story remains radically unfinished (Wheeler, 2010a).  
 
Despite this common shortfall, however, the situation is arguably worse for Dreyfus than it is 
for me. For although, in the quoted passage, Dreyfus is focussed on the way in which 
background coping grounds context-switching, his position, as I understand it, is that it is at 
root the same set of complex, dynamical, nonrepresentational structures and processes that 
materially enables both intra-context sensitivity to relevance (whether absorbed or disturbed) 
and context-switching. This is seemingly a straightforward consequence of Dreyfus’s claim 
(see above) that all coping, whether ready-to-hand or un-ready-to-hand, depends on 
background coping, plus his favoured account of the causal mechanisms underlying the latter. 
As we have just seen, though, there is an acute worry hereabouts, namely that any appeal to 
the kinds of structures and processes highlighted by Dreyfus presupposes a further account of 
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mechanistic relevance-sensitivity to explain precisely how those elements are harnessed in 
appropriate ways. As far as I can tell, this worry concerning the explanatory power of the 
dynamical systems in question applies just as much to the intra-context case as it does to the 
inter-context case. And it is in the light of this observation that my view emerges with the 
advantage. For although I share the highlighted problem in the inter-context case, I do not 
share it in the intra-context case. My claim, pace Dreyfus, is that intra-context sensitivity to 
relevance is materially enabled by (what I called earlier) thrown machines, special-purpose 
and closely coupled brain-body-environment mechanisms. This claim is not undermined by 
the considerations on the table.  
 
We now have a new dispute in view, one that concerns the relative scope and power of 
continuous reciprocal dynamics and thrown machines within a Heideggerian cognitive 
science. Can we resolve this new dispute? Rietveld thinks we can. Unfortunately for me, 
however, he thinks that the resolution comes out in Dreyfus’s favour. To bring my self-
interested defence to a close, then, I shall attempt to resist Rietveld’s arguments.      
 
6. The Dimensionality of the Problem of Relevance  
 
Rietveld (this volume) argues that my distinction between intra-context sensitivity to 
relevance and inter-context-sensitivity to relevance is ultimately unsustainable, on the 
grounds that one can speak of genuine sensitivity to relevance only where there exists the 
intrinsic possibility of context-switching, that is, where human activity remains essentially 
sensitive to the holistic structure of the background. In Rietveld’s own words, the “distinction 
does not make much sense for understanding normal behavior, because in cases of human 
(and animal) online intelligence, sensitivity to real relevance is not a feature of 
responsiveness to some limited part of the context (as “intra-contextual” sensitivity to 
relevance would imply) but of responsiveness to the individual’s full particular and complex 
situation” (Rietveld, this volume, p.??). If Rietveld’s reasoning is sound, it would provide 
support for a Dreyfus-style account of the relationship between background coping and 
absorbed/disturbed coping, since there would be no precise boundary separating the context-
specific forms of coping from holistic background coping, but only local ways for the latter to 
be revealed within the former through the ongoing evolution of the shifting attractor 
landscapes that characterize the underlying neurodynamics. Correlatively, there would be 
something seriously misguided about my attempt to carve out a causal domain in which 
thrown machines operate in such a way that they are somehow encapsulated from holistic 
significance. Thus, Rietveld concludes, “[s]ince Wheeler has already agreed with Dreyfus 
that continuous reciprocal causation… underlies contextual sensitivity (“inter-context” 
switching) on broader scales, [Wheeler] should accept that in the end [such causation] turns 
out to be the mechanical basis of all online sensitivity to real context-dependent relevance, 
not just of inter-context sensitivity” (Rietveld, this volume, p.??).  
 
Rietveld’s case against the contested distinction involves two converging lines of argument. 
According to the first, if we use neuropsychology to determine the location of the most 
plausible candidates for thrown machines in humans (should any such mechanisms exist), it 
turns out that they will be found in the lateral premotor cortex. However, it also transpires 
that the successful functioning of those machines depends on prior (i.e., pre-sensing) activity 
in the medial premotor system. The experimental data suggests that this prior activity tunes 
the candidate mechanisms in the lateral premotor cortex to what is currently relevant to the 
individual concerned, by orienting those mechanisms’ sensory expectations (see Rietveld, 
this volume, for supporting data and references). The key idea, I think, is this: since 
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background-sensitive global tuning determines the local sensory-sensitivities of the candidate 
special-purpose thrown machines, one cannot hold onto the view that those machines are 
functionally isolated from the background, in the way that the distinction between inter-
context and intra-context sensitivity to relevance would suggest.  
 
In considering this argument, let me begin by recording a concern about the way in which 
Rietveld sets up his example. Bemoaning the fact that I am “not explicit about the specific 
neural mechanisms that could underlie human “intra-context” sensitivity to relevance” 
(Rietveld, this volume, p.??), he locks on to the lateral premotor cortex as a likely site for 
thrown machines in human beings, should any such machines exist. However, I am not 
inclined to think of the paradigm cases of thrown machines as purely neural routines, but 
rather as distributed partnerships that incorporate neural routines, non-neural bodily elements, 
and environmental factors. Consider, for example, the evolved robotic mechanism for 
triangle-square discrimination discussed earlier, in which significant contributions to adaptive 
success are made not only by the activation profile of the inner neural network, but also by 
the geometric arrangement of the robot’s peripheral sensors and by the specific structure of 
the environment (the mechanism would presumably fail to track only triangles in 
environments populated by sloping edges that weren’t parts of triangles). This makes me 
suspicious that Rietveld’s purely neural routines couldn’t really count as complete thrown 
machines at all. Waiving this concern, however, the mere fact that a candidate thrown 
machine depends on prior processing elsewhere in the system to orient its sensitivities before 
it becomes active does not, as far as I can tell, undermine the encapsulated status of that 
mechanism during its processing cycle. This way of thinking about thrown machines 
becomes clearer, I think, once it is noted that such machines may emerge as transient phases 
of modularity in a system that, at other times, exhibits continuous reciprocal causation (for an 
example, see Wheeler, 2005, p.265). In such dynamically shifting mechanisms, the pre-
modular phases of holistic reorganization presumably play a role in establishing the 
conditions for the subsequent online operation of the emergent thrown machines. But if this 
picture is right, then the existence of the kind of prior processing on which Rietveld hangs his 
argument does not destabilize the distinction between inter-context and intra-context 
relevance-sensitivity. Rather, it usefully highlights an aspect of the relationship between the 
two phases of operation.   
 
Rietveld’s second line of argument depends on the thought that a certain psychopathology, 
so-called utilization behaviour (UB; see, e.g., Lhermitte, 1983), tells us what human activity 
would be like, if it were in fact underpinned by thrown machines. UB sufferers are sensitive 
to the local affordances provided by the immediate environment in a way that is insensitive to 
the distinction between socially appropriate and socially inappropriate actions. As a result, 
although the sufferer’s behavioural responses remain “technically adequate” (Rietveld, this 
volume, p.??), contextually inappropriate actions are not inhibited, even though broader 
background knowledge should discourage them. For example, a UB sufferer may 
enthusiastically launch into the act of making a bed, even if this bed is in someone else’s 
house. Rietveld’s diagnosis is that UB results from a disruption of the normal tendency of 
human agents to situate the local context of action within its holistic background. As he puts 
it, “immediate responsiveness to affordances has lost its sensitivity to the full particular 
situation” (Rietveld, this volume, p.??). And this, he argues, is how all human activity would 
be if it were underpinned by thrown machines. “Patients with UB manifest what Wheeler 
would call “intra-context” sensitivity to relevance (they act in technically adequate ways). 
Yet, given their full particular situation (or context) their actions are inappropriate and we can 
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characterize their behavior as form of responsiveness to irrelevant affordances” (Rietveld, 
this volume, p.??). 
 
What strikes me as problematic about this argument is Rietveld’s claim that UB patients 
realize a properly working thrown machine. Indeed, as Rietveld rightly notes, technical 
adequacy is not sufficient for relevance-sensitivity. To explain the missing relevance-
sensitivity of such merely technically adequate behaviour, I am inclined to conclude not, with 
Rietveld, that thrown machines are incapable of genuine relevance-sensitivity, but that UB 
patients either have a faulty thrown machine (in effect, one that isn’t thrown) or have a 
breakdown at the interface between their thrown machines and whatever prior processing 
might be in place to orient the sensitivities of those machines (see above). Ironically, given 
Rietveld’s intentions, one might develop the latter possibility via the suggestion that the 
behaviour of the UB patient is explained by the fact that the separation between local context 
and background has collapsed in such a way that the background is now entirely explicated 
by the actual focus of interest, such that no other contexts are possible (Cappuccio and 
Wheeler, forthcoming). It is as if the sensitivities of his thrown machine have been set up in 
such a way that the bed is the totality of the world with which he must deal. 
 
To this sort of response, Rietveld will object that to make good on the idea that thrown 
machines meet the adequacy condition on relevance-sensitivity (which, roughly, is that they 
must exhibit the kinds of sensitivities that UB patients lack), I would need to expand what 
counts as intra-contextually relevant. For example, as he notes, I might claim that the bed-
making context should include not only the made or unmade state of the bed, but also 
whether or not the bed is in someone else’s house. But this strategy, he argues, will end up 
collapsing the very distinction that I am trying to shore up, since once one starts to enlarge 
the set of context-specifying factors, it seems that there is no properly motivated principle 
that could lead us to stop short of fading into the background itself. Thus he writes: “[p]ulling 
this string of broadening the “intra-context” does not help Wheeler, because it amounts to 
requiring the kind of global holism that “intra-context sensitivity to relevance” by definition 
lacks”, such that “the individual ends up coping with exactly the same full and particular (or 
“inter”) context that Wheeler had wanted to reserve for context switching” (Rietveld, this 
volume, p.??).  
 
This is, I admit, a genuine risk, one that casts a spotlight on the Herculean theoretical 
challenge of giving a theory of how our cognitive systems determine where the boundaries of 
contexts lie. It seems to me, however, that at this juncture we confront a choice. Either we 
remain committed to the distinction between intra-context and inter-context sensitivity to 
relevance, and so humbly accept the challenge to give a theory of context determination, or 
we follow Dreyfus and Rietveld in rejecting that distinction, and so confront the fact that, as I 
argued earlier, our Heideggerian cognitive science of relevance-sensitivity in general, and not 
just of context-switching, has barely begun. At present I am backing the first of these horses, 
but that is a bet whose fate will be decided by the ongoing intelligible interplay between 
phenomenological philosophy and empirical cognitive science that characterizes the still-
unfolding and intellectually exciting story that is Heideggerian cognitive science.   
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